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1 Introduction
Movements in exchange rates can have an important influence on an imperfectly competitive ex-
porter’s pricing behavior. Exchange rates create a wedge between the price set by the exporter
and the price paid by the importer, and can be used as an instrument of price discrimination.
The idea that an exporter can adjust destination-specific markups to accommodate changes in
exchange rates was first documented in Mann (1986) and later was termed “pricing-to-market”
(PTM) by Krugman (1987). Knetter (1989) developed an empirical model to analyze the pres-
ence of PTM. Knetter’s model has since been used extensively, due to its simplicity and data
availability, to determine the presence of price discrimination in international trade. Examples of
studies include: Knetter (1989, 1993), Marston (1990), Gagnon and Knetter (1995) in the auto
industry; Pick and Carter (1994), Carew and Florkowski (2003), Glauben and Loy (2003) in the
food and agriculture industry; and Gil-Pareja (2002) for 26 products covering a wide range of
industries.1
Most PTM studies, such as those listed above, use export unit values as the price variable.2
Export unit values are calculated as the ratio of value to volume of exports for a specific product
category and destination country. Market- or customer-specific price information is typically con-
fidential, making export unit values the next best alternative. The disadvantage of unit values is
that they often aggregate data on products employed for very different uses.3 Thus, findings of
PTM that are attributed to price discrimination might alternatively indicate product differentia-
tion when unit values are used (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001). It is important to understand the effect
of unit value data on PTM testing because evidence, or lack of evidence, of PTM can be used for
policy purposes (e.g., Carter, 1993; Gil-Pareja, 2003). Moreover, PTM can have important effects
on the international transmission of monetary and fiscal policy, and can increase exchange rate
volatility, relative to a situation where markets are integrated (Betts and Devereux, 2000). The
objective of our study is to examine the impact of the use of unit values aggregating differentiated
products on the evaluation of pricing-to-market.
Product differentiation has been explicitly modelled in studies evaluating the extent of ex-
change rate pass-through (e.g., Dornbusch (1987), Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter (1996), Yang
1We count over 100 studies under a search “pricing-to-market” by default fields in EconLit, not counting working
paper duplicates.
2Some exceptions include Goldberg and Verboven (2001) and Gil-Pareja (2003), who use product level data.
3Gehlhar and Pick (2002) found that 40 percent of U.S. food exports are characterized by non-price competition,
such as product differentiation. For those products, they argue that unit values are a poor measure of prices in
international trade.
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(1997), Bodnar, Dumas and Marston (2002)).4 In these studies, substitution occurs between a
good produced by the home firm and a good produced by the foreign firm. Our analysis of product
differentiation differs from the above studies in two respects. First, substitution occurs between
a set of vertically differentiated goods produced in the home country and sold to the home and
a foreign market. Second, we examine specifically how product differentiation affects the test of
PTM.
The disadvantages of unit values are acknowledged in many PTM studies using Knetter’s
model. Common criticisms of unit values are that they do not account for different qualities
shipped to different markets and for changes in product quality over time (Gil Pareja, 2002).5
However, authors, like Knetter (1989), typically argue that systematic differences in product
quality, such as shipping different qualities to different markets, can be captured by country
dummies. Similarly, changes in the quality of the product that is common across countries can be
captured by time effects. Thus, the impact of product differentiation on the evaluation of PTM
is typically argued to be minimal.
While prior authors acknowledge the problems associated with unit values when they reflect
different qualities shipped to different countries or across time, we address an issue that to our
knowledge has not been addressed before. Namely, we examine destination-specific changes in
the product-quality mix and the use of unit values in PTM studies. More specifically, changes in
the product-quality mix can be the result of fluctuations in the exchange rate. This is a problem
when, as it is often the case, unit values represent a composite of differentiated products exported
to a given market. In this case, false detection of PTM may occur.
In this paper, we explain how unit values aggregating differentiated products can result in
false PTM findings and we show that the magnitude of the bias depends on the level of product
differentiation.6 For this purpose, we introduce a conceptual model where a monopolist sells
vertically differentiated products to a domestic and a foreign market. Two polar scenarios are
analyzed. In the first one, there is perfect and costless consumer arbitrage, and the law of one price
(LOP) holds for individual products (i.e., before aggregation). In the second scenario, consumer
arbitrage is not feasible and markets are segmented. In both scenarios, we find “pseudo PTM,”
i.e., PTM that is purely the result of data aggregation and product differentiation rather than
4Exchange rate pass-through refers to the extent to which the price to a given importing country adjusts to
changes in the exchange rate.
5See also Alston, Carter, and Whitney (1992), and Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for discussions on the use of
unit values in the evaluation of PTM.
6Price stickiness and currency invoicing have also been indicated as potential reasons for bias in PTM findings
(e.g., Goldberg and Knetter, 1997; Glauben and Loy, 2003; Gervais and Larue, 2004).
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price discrimination across markets. In the first scenario, there is pseudo PTM only. In the second
scenario, there is “real PTM” as well because markets are segmented. We show that the extent
of pseudo PTM increases with the level of product differentiation.7 To evaluate the implications
for empirical work, we employ Monte Carlo simulations analyzing the relationship between PTM
and the level of product differentiation. The results indicate the presence of pseudo PTM for a
sufficiently high level of product differentiation when the LOP holds. In both scenarios, a higher
level of product differentiation is more likely to lead to a statistically significant evidence of PTM.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The conceptual model is presented in section
2 and the two scenarios are analyzed in section 3. Section 4 provides a simulation study and we
conclude in section 5.
2 The model
Consider two countries: country 1 and 2. A monopolist in country 1 produces two vertically
differentiated products with exogenous qualities ql and qh (0 < ql < qh).8 The two goods are sold
domestically and exported to country 2. The marginal cost is 12q
2
j for the product of quality qj
(j = l, h).9
We model vertical differentiation a` la Mussa and Rosen (1978). Consumers are heterogeneous
in their preference for quality. A consumer with preference parameter θ will enjoy a utility of
θq − p if she buys one unit of the product of quality q at price p, and zero if she buys nothing.
There is a continuum of consumers in each country, i.e., θ ∈ U [0, θi] with density 1/θi in country
i (i = 1, 2).
Let θil (i = 1, 2) denote the consumer in market i who is indifferent between buying the low-
quality product or buying nothing. That is, θil is the value of θ that solves θql−λi ·pil = 0, where
λ1 = 1 and λ2 = e, and e is the exchange rate expressed in units of country 2’s currency per unit of
country 1’s currency.10 Similarly, θih is the consumer in market i who is indifferent between buying
the low- or high-quality product, i.e., θih is the value of θ that solves θqh − λi · pih = θql − λi · pil
with λ1 = 1 and λ2 = e. Thus, consumers with θ ∈ [0, θil) will not buy, those with θ ∈ [θil, θih]
will buy the low-quality product and the others (θ ∈ (θih, θi]) will buy the high-quality product.
7This is in the same spirit as in Bodnar, Dumas and Marston (2002), who find that higher product substitutability
moderates exchange rate pass-through, using a model where an exporting firm and a foreign import-competing firm
produce products of various substitutability.
8See footnote 16 (p.9) for a discussion on endogenous qualities.
9When marginal cost is linear in quality, it can be shown that only the high-quality product will be sold.
10Throughout this article, prices are expressed in country 1’s currency.
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Accordingly, the demands for the low- and high-quality products in country i = 1, 2 are:
dil(pih, pil) =
θih − θil
θi
=
λi(pihql − pilqh)
θi(qh − ql)ql ,
dih(pih, pil) =
θi − θih
θi
= 1− λi(ph − pl)
θi(qh − ql) .
When there is pricing-to-market, a firm with market power will set different prices (in the
same currency) in different markets based on their respective market conditions. Accordingly,
Marston (1990) examines PTM by forming the ratio of the export to the home price set by a
domestic monopolist and evaluating how it varies with the exchange rate. Similarly, we use the
domestic-export price ratio
X =
P1
P2
, (1)
where Pi is the price in country i, expressed in country 1’s currency.11 The PTM effect can be
measured as the effect of a change in the exchange rate on X. When there is PTM, a change
in the exchange rate will have a non-zero impact on the ratio X. In other words, there is PTM
when the exporter responds to a change in the exchange rate by varying the price to one or both
markets not proportionally. Alternatively, in our setting, there is no PTM when X ≡ 1.
We consider two scenarios. In the first one, the LOP holds for each individual product, and
the prices of each product in the two markets are equal in the same currency. In the other
scenario, markets are segmented and arbitrage between consumers across countries is not feasible.
Consequently, each product is sold by the monopolist at different prices in each country.
3 Analysis
In this section, we solve for the equilibrium price and quantities in each scenario. The monopolist’s
objective is to maximize profit by choosing prices. Using equilibrium prices and quantities, we
calculate the unit values of sales to each country, expressed in country’s 1 currency. Unit values
then enter the domestic-export price ratio (X), which is used to determine the presence of PTM.
We begin with the first scenario where the law of one price (LOP) holds for each product.
Scenario 1. LOP holds
The monopolist cannot price discriminate between market 1 and 2 in this scenario. Thus pil = pl
and pih = ph (i = 1, 2), and profit is maximized according to:
max
pl,ph
(pl − 12q
2
l )(d1l + d2l) + (ph −
1
2
q2h)(d1h + d2h)
11Other studies using this measure include Bergin and Feenstra (2001) and Gervais and Larue (2004).
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where dil(pl, ph) and dih(pl, ph) are the demand functions for the low- and high-quality product
in country i (i = 1, 2) as derived in section 2. Note that the prices pl and ph are set by the
monopolist in country 1’s currency, whereas consumers’ demand in market 2 is a function of the
price in the local currency, i.e., pl · e and ph · e, where e is the exchange rate. We assume that in
equilibrium the monopolist produces both products and sells to both countries.12
From the first-order conditions, we obtain the equilibrium prices p∗l and p
∗
h and the equilibrium
quantities d∗il and d
∗
ih for market i (i = 1, 2).
13 The unit value Pi is computed as the weighted
average price to market i, i.e.:
Pi =
p∗l d
∗
il + p
∗
hd
∗
ih
d∗il + d
∗
ih
(2)
The presence of PTM is determined by computing X = P1P2 and evaluating whether it is identically
equal to one or varies with the exchange rate. Our results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 When the LOP holds for individual products, there is pseudo PTM when using
unit values.
Proof. We begin with the premise that there is no PTM when X = P1P2 ≡ 1. Substituting
equation (2) into equation (1), the domestic-export price ratio can be expressed as
X =
p∗l σ1 + p
∗
h(1− σ1)
p∗l σ2 + p
∗
h(1− σ2)
(3)
where σi =
d∗il
d∗il+d
∗
ih
(i = 1, 2), is the fraction of low-quality product in country i.
ForX = 1, it must be that σ1 = σ2. Substituting the equilibrium quantities (see the appendix),
we have
σ1 =
qh(θ2 + eθ1)
4eθ21 − ql(θ2 + eθ1)
and σ2 =
qhe(θ2 + eθ1)
4θ22 − eql(θ2 + eθ1)
.
It follows that θ2 = eθ1 is required for σ1 = σ2. Given that θ1 and θ2 are fixed parameters,
σ1 = σ2 cannot hold when e varies. Thus, X ≡ 1 does not hold, indicating PTM. We find false
evidence of PTM (pseudo PTM) using unit values.
Pseudo PTM is found because the exchange rate affects the ratio of unit values through a
change in the product-quality mix. An appreciation of the foreign currency (decrease in e) results
in an increase in imports of the high-quality variety in country 2 relative to the total quantity of
imports. The reverse is true for a depreciation of the foreign currency.
12It can be easily shown that the monopolist is better off supplying both products than supplying either product
in both scenarios.
13See the appendix for the derivations of the equilibrium prices and quantities.
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The shift in the product-quality mix occurs because fluctuations in the exchange rate affect
the relative utility obtained from the high-quality variety in market 2. To illustrate, note that
Uh
Ul
=
θ2qh − eph
θ2ql − epl
and the derivative with respect to the exchange rate is
∂(Uh/Ul)
∂e
=
θ2(plqh − phql)
(θ2ql − epl)2 .
When phqh >
pl
ql
– a necessary condition that is always satisfied in equilibrium for the demand
of both goods to be positive – this derivative is negative. In other words, even though both
goods face the same change in the exchange rate, a decrease in exchange rate raises the relative
utility of the high-quality good, which results in a shift in product-quality mix toward the higher
quality product, i.e., quality upgrading.14 Conversely, an increase in the exchange rate results
in a shift in the product-quality mix towards the lower quality product.15 There is evidence
of quality upgrading or downgrading following movements in the exchange rates or government
instruments having a similar effect on prices (e.g., ad valorem tariffs). Conley and Peterson
(1995) find evidence for a decrease in quality of U.S. export of beef products to Japan following
a depreciation of yen in the 1980s. Hummels and Skiba (2004) show that lower ad valorem tariffs
and higher transportation cost result in quality upgrading using export data for more than 5000
product categories.
Remark Under perfect competition, where export prices are equal to marginal cost, we also find
pseudo PTM using unit values.
The intuition for this remark is the same as presented for proposition 1. This result is par-
ticularly important given that PTM results are typically interpreted as evidence of imperfect
competition (Goldberg and Knetter, 1997).
14Feenstra (1995) notes that quality upgrading “can refer to either a shift in demand towards higher priced import
varieties (i.e., a change in product mix), or to the addition of improved characteristics on each variety.” (p.1572)
15This result is akin to the Alchian-Allen theorem – a per unit increase in price lowers the price of the high-
quality good relative to the low-quality good thus raising the consumption of the high-quality good (Borcherding
and Silberberg, 1978). This result has motivated the vast literature on trade restraints and quality upgrading
(e.g., Falvey, 1979; Aw and Robert, 1986; Krishna, 1987; Feenstra, 1988; Boorstein and Feenstra, 1991). Exchange
rates have the same effect on prices as ad valorem tariffs and taxes. Results in the literature differ on whether ad
valorem tariffs have an effect on quality according to the homotheticity of preferences (Krishna, 1992). With non-
homothetic preferences, such as those resulting from vertical differentiation models a` la Mussa and Rosen (1978),
Das and Donnenfeld (1987), Donnenfeld (1988), and Wall (1992) find that ad valorem tariffs result in quality
downgrading and Krishna (1990) finds an ambiguous effect on quality. That tariffs result in quality downgrading
mirrors our result that a foreign currency depreciation (appreciation) results in quality downgrading (upgrading).
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Scenario 2. Market segmentation
In this scenario, the monopolist price discriminates between markets. Each market can be treated
independently because of the assumption of constant marginal cost with respect to quantity. The
monopolist maximizes profit by setting the price pij to country i (i = 1, 2) for product of quality
qj (j = l, h) according to:
max
pil,pih
(pil − 12q
2
l )dil + (pih −
1
2
q2h)dih
for market i (i = 1, 2), where dil(pl, ph) and dih(pl, ph) are the demand functions for the low- and
high-quality product in country i as derived in section 2.
Define Xl as the domestic-export price ratio for the low-quality product (i.e., p∗1l/p
∗
2l) and Xh,
as that for the high-quality product (i.e., p∗1h/p
∗
2h). A ratio different from one or varying with
exchange rates indicates that the monopolist price discriminates. Thus, there is real PTM when
Xl ≡ 1 or Xh ≡ 1 does not hold. The next proposition summarizes our findings for this scenario.
Proposition 2 When markets are segmented,
i) There is real PTM for each individual product.
ii) There is both real and pseudo PTM when using unit values.
Proof. i) Substituting the expressions for the equilibrium prices (see scenario 2 in the appendix),
the domestic-export price ratios can be expressed as
Xl =
(2θ1 + ql)e
2θ2 + eql
, and Xh =
(2θ1 + qh)e
2θ2 + eqh
.
For Xl = Xh = 1, it must be that θ2 = eθ1. Given that θ1 and θ2 are fixed parameters, θ2 = eθ1
cannot hold when e varies. Thus, Xl ≡ 1 and Xh ≡ 1 do not hold, indicating PTM. We label
this result “real PTM” given that the non-aggregated prices used in this calculation are set by a
discriminatory monopolist.
ii) Because the two markets are independent, fluctuations in the exchange rates affect only
the equilibrium prices and quantities in market 2. Thus, a change in the exchange rate would
affect the domestic-export price ratio (X = P1P2 ) only through P2, which can be expressed as
P2 =
p∗1lσ2
Xl
+ p
∗
1h(1−σ2)
Xh
. It follows that
∂P2
∂e
=
∂σ2
∂e
(
p∗1l
Xl
− p
∗
1h
Xh
)
− ∂Xl
∂e
p∗1l
X2l
σ2 − ∂Xh
∂e
p∗1h
X2h
(1− σ2) < 0.
A change in the exchange rate affects P2 through 1) a change in the composition of imports (σ2)
generating the pseudo PTM effect, and 2) a change in Xl and Xh, which reflect real PTM. The
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negative sign of the derivative follows from: ∂σ2∂e =
2qhθ2
(2θ2−eql)2 > 0,
(
p∗1l
Xl
− p∗1hXh
)
= p∗2l − p∗2h < 0,
∂Xl
∂e =
2θ2(2θ1+ql)
(2θ2+eql)2
> 0, ∂Xh∂e =
2θ2(2θ1+qh)
(2θ2+eqh)2
> 0, and (1− σ2) > 0. Thus, ∂X∂e > 0 (because ∂P1∂e = 0,
∂P2
∂e < 0) due to both real and pseudo PTM.
As with scenario 1, a change in the exchange rate affects the composition of imports. This
effect does not matter when examining PTM using individual product prices. However, because
unit values constitute a weighted average of the price of high- and low-quality good in each
market, a change in the exchange rate not only affects the landed prices in country 2, but also the
weights associated to those prices through a change in the product-quality mix imported. Thus,
PTM findings are the result of two effects: 1) a true PTM effect, because the monopolist does
price discriminate in this scenario, and 2) a pseudo PTM due to the use of unit values, which
average the price of good h and l, and the resulting change in the composition of imports following
fluctuations in the exchange rate.
This result indicates that one would conclude correctly that there is PTM using unit values as
prices. However, there is also pseudo PTM. The extent to which X departs from one is affected by
the aggregation of differentiated products, i.e., the importance of pseudo PTM. In what follows,
we examine the relationship between the level of product differentiation and the extent of pseudo
PTM for both scenarios. Increasing levels of product differentiation is modelled by fixing ql and
increasing qh. The next two corollaries summarize our results.16
Corollary 3 Under the LOP, the extent of pseudo PTM increases with the level of product dif-
ferentiation.
Proof. Under the LOP, PTM findings using unit values represent solely pseudo PTM. Thus, let
|X − 1| measure the extent of pseudo PTM. The extent of pseudo PTM increases with product
differentiation if |X − 1| increases with qh. To show that, we need to show that if X − 1 > 0, then
16Our setting assumes that quality is exogenous. Alternatively, quality can be endogenous and the monopolist
chooses qualities followed by prices. The qualitative results do not change, i.e., there is always pseudo PTM. If a
change in the exchange rate does not induce a change in the qualities (e.g., the change is perceived to be temporary
and quality adjustments are costly, as in the short run), qualities are fixed once chosen. Because our findings
of pseudo PTM holds for any qh > ql > 0, endogenous qualities do not improve the model. If qualities adjust
automatically with a change in the exchange rate (say in the long run), we also find pseudo PTM. One important
disadvantage of the endogenous quality model will become obvious with corollaries 3 and 4 – it does not allow us to
determine how product differentiation affects the extent of pseudo PTM. This outcome of our model is important
because in the construction of unit values, aggregation is performed over products that are more differentiated in
some industries than in others.
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∂X
∂qh
> 0, and if X−1 < 0, then ∂X∂qh < 0. In the appendix we show that when θ2 < eθ1, X−1 > 0,
and ∂X∂qh > 0. When θ2 > eθ1, X − 1 < 0, and ∂X∂qh < 0.
Corollary 4 Under market segmentation, the extent of pseudo PTM increases with the level of
product differentiation.
Proof. Recall that Xl =
p∗1l
p∗2l
, Xh =
p∗1h
p∗2h
and X = p
∗
1lσ1+p
∗
1h(1−σ1)
p∗2lσ2+p
∗
2h(1−σ2) . Under market segmentation
(scenario 2), findings of PTM using unit values represent both real and pseudo PTM. Let |X−Xh|
and |X −Xl| together measure the extent of pseudo PTM in this scenario. The extent of pseudo
PTM increases with product differentiation if |X−Xj | (j = h, l) increases with qh. To show that,
we need to show that if X −Xj > 0 then ∂(X−Xj)∂qh > 0, and if X −Xj < 0 then
∂(X−Xj)
∂qh
< 0. We
divide this proof into two cases.
Case 1. θ2 < eθ1
Note that when qh = ql, Xl = Xh = X > 1. Moreover, ∂Xl∂qh = 0,
∂Xh
∂qh
< 0, limqh→∞Xh = 1, and
∂X
∂qh
> 0.17 This implies that when qh > ql, X − Xj > 0 and ∂(X−Xj)∂qh > 0 (j = h, l). See the
appendix for the derivations.
Case 2. θ2 > eθ1
When qh = ql, Xl = Xh = X < 1. Moreover, ∂Xl∂qh = 0,
∂Xh
∂qh
> 0, limqh→∞Xh = 1, and
∂X
∂qh
< 0.18
This implies that when qh > ql, X −Xj < 0 and ∂(X−Xj)∂qh < 0 (j = h, l). See the appendix for the
derivations.
To get a sense of how X, Xl, and Xh vary with the level of product differentiation (qh), we
take scenario 2’s model, assign parameter values, and plot these three measures against qh. We
set ql = 0.3, θ1 = 1, θ2 = 2, e = 3 (θ2 < eθ1). The results are provided in Figure 1. As indicated
in the second case of corollary 4, when qh = ql, Xl = Xh = X > 1, indicating PTM but no pseudo
PTM. With differentiated products (qh > ql), there is pseudo PTM because X is different from
Xh and Xl. Moreover, the graph clearly shows the increasing importance of pseudo PTM with
greater levels of product differentiation because X moves away from both Xl and Xh when qh
increases.19
17As product differentiation increases, Xh decreases but never actually reaches a value of 1 because negative
quantities of either variety are not allowed. Thus, Xh > 1 and X > Xl > Xh > 1.
18As product differentiation increases, Xh increases but never actually reaches a value of 1 because negative
quantities of either variety are not allowed. Thus, Xh < 1 and X < Xl < Xh < 1.
19In the process of proving corollary 4, we also showed that when there is both real and pseudo PTM, product
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Figure 1: Domestic-export price ratios and product differentiation
4 Simulations
Our theoretical results indicate that when sales to a given market involve differentiated products
and unit values are used as prices to evaluate PTM, there is always pseudo PTM. This result
applies with or without price discrimination and even under perfect competition. This implies
that in regression analyses following Knetter (1989), the exchange rate coefficient may pick up the
effects of pseudo PTM. Next we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation to investigate 1) how prevalent
are false statistical findings of PTM, and 2) quantify how the level of product differentiation
impacts statistical findings of PTM.
We estimate the following model,
lnXt = β0 + β1 ln et + Ut, t = 1 . . . T (4)
differentiation exaggerates the real level of price dispersion, i.e., the extent to which the prices to the two markets
differ. The more X, Xh, and Xl diverge from 1 (in a positive or negative fashion), the greater the price dispersion.
When θ2 < eθ1 and qh > ql, X > Xl > Xh > 1, and X shows a greater price dispersion than is demonstrated by
either Xh or Xl. When θ2 > eθ1 and qh > ql, X < Xl < Xh < 1, and X again shows a greater price dispersion
than is demonstrated by either Xh or Xl.
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where T is the number of draws, et ∼ U [a, b] is the exchange rate for draw t. Xt is the
domestic-export price ratio generated as P1(et)+1tP2(et)+2t , where Pi(et) is the unit value for market i
(i = 1, 2)computed as described in each scenario of section 3, and it ∼ N(0, σ2) and are identi-
cally and independently distributed across i and t.
If there is no PTM, the domestic-export price ratio should be independent of the exchange
rate and β1 should be zero. By analyzing the estimate of β1 under different levels of product
differentiation, we can evaluate the effect of product differentiation on pseudo PTM.
We estimate the above model under the two scenarios examined in section 3. For both sce-
narios, we set a = 1.5, b = 2.5, σ = 1/15, T=100 (the number of draws), θ1 = 1, θ2 = 2, and
ql = 0.3.20 We conduct 1000 trials for each level of product differentiation (qh) to obtain βˆ1 and
its p-value. The means of βˆ1 and the percentages of trials with p-value less than 10% are provided
in tables 1 and 2.
Table 1: βˆ1 under the LOP scenario
qh number of trials mean of βˆ1 percentage of trials with p-value < 10%
.4 1000 .1717 12.5%
.5 1000 .3975 42.8%
.6 1000 .6218 85.6%
.7 1000 .8841 99.6%
Table 2: βˆ1 under the market segmentation scenario
qh number of trials mean of βˆ1 percentage of trials with p-value < 10%
.4 1000 1.0328 90.6%
.5 1000 1.0702 99.3%
.6 1000 1.1361 100%
.7 1000 1.2267 100%
Table 1 is consistent with our theoretical results and indicates that when products are suffi-
ciently differentiated, statistically significant results suggesting PTM may be obtained, although
there is no real PTM. We obtain false evidence of PTM with over 42% of our trials when qh = .5
20The parameters are chosen to ensure that all equilibrium prices and demands are nonnegative. Moreover,
Pi(et) + it must be positive to calculate lnXt, and σ is chosen accordingly.
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and almost 100% of the trials when qh = .7. Table 2 reflects scenario 2 where there is both
real and pseudo PTM. For all levels of product differentiation, the significance level (1− p-value)
is higher than in the first scenario. This is intuitive given that there is pseudo as well as real
PTM in this case. Both tables indicate that that the PTM elasticity (βˆ1) increases with product
differentiation, and so does the proportion of statistical PTM findings – a result consistent with
corollaries 3 and 4.21
5 Conclusion
In this study, we examine the extent to which a false detection of pricing-to-market (pseudo
PTM) arises from the use of unit value data. To do so, we analyze two scenarios. Both scenarios
involve a monopolist located in the home country producing a low- and high-quality variety of
a good. In the first scenario, arbitrage prevails and the monopolist charges the same price for
each variety in both markets. In the second scenario, arbitrage is not possible and the monopolist
price discriminates between the two markets. Pseudo PTM is found in both scenarios. Findings
of PTM when the law of one price (LOP) holds are purely spurious, whereas they represent a
combination of real and pseudo PTM when markets are segmented. Moreover, pseudo PTM is
found even under perfect competition. Pseudo PTM occurs because movements in the exchange
rate alter the product-quality mix sold to each market thus affecting the unit values, even when
the prices to the two markets are identical by variety.
For both scenarios, we determined that product differentiation increases the extent to which
results are biased by pseudo PTM, thus increasing the likelihood of false detection of PTM
in empirical work. Our simulation results show that for sufficiently differentiated products, a
statistical finding of PTM occurs when the LOP holds. Moreover, the PTM elasticity increases
with product differentiation in both scenarios.
While other potential reasons have been raised for bias in PTM findings (e.g., currency in-
voicing and menu costs), our results suggest that the prevalence of PTM findings in the literature
could also be attributed to the use of unit values aggregating differentiated products. PTM
findings have been interpreted as evidence of price discrimination and market power, without
explaining the source of market segmentation or market power (see Goldberg and Knetter, 1997
for a discussion). Sexton and Lavoie (2001) also observe the general lack of justification for the
examination of imperfect competition and price discrimination among PTM studies focusing on
food and agricultural products. Thus, our research emphasizes the need for future PTM studies to
21We can verify numerically using our theoretical results that ∂lnX
∂ln e
increases with qh.
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1) investigate the plausibility of market power in international trade of the product of interest, 2)
evaluate the level of differentiation present in the export unit value data for the product category
chosen, and 3) interpret the results accordingly. Alternatively, more confidence can be placed on
results obtained using disaggregated data for which there are good reasons to believe exporters
have market power in the international market (i.e., they produce a differentiated product relative
to other countries’ products, exports are conducted by a large entity, such as a state-trading firm,
the exporter has a large world market share, etc.).22 Such caution is especially important when
results are used for policy purposes.
We have examined the bias in PTM results when unit values aggregate vertically differentiated
products. Future research includes finding ways to mitigate pseudo PTM (e.g., by controlling for
quality changes) and analyzing pseudo PTM in other settings, such as horizontal differentiation.
22See for example Gil-Pareja (2002), and Glauben and Loy (2003) where such care is taken.
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APPENDIX
1. Derivations of equilibrium prices and quantities
Scenario 1
In country 1, the consumer indifferent between buying the low-quality product or buying nothing
is defined by the value of θ solving θql − pl = 0, i.e., θ1l = plql . Similarly, the consumer indifferent
between the low- and high-quality products is defined by the value of θ solving equation θqh−ph =
θql − pl, i.e. θ1h = ph−plqh−ql .
Thus the low-quality product is purchased by consumers with θ ∈ [θ1l, θ1h] and the demand
for the low-quality product is,
d1l =
θ1h − θ1l
θ1
=
qlph − plqh
(qh − ql)qlθ1 .
The high-quality product is purchased by consumers with θ ∈ (θ1h, θ1] and the demand for the
high-quality product is,
d1h =
θ1 − θ1h
θ1
= 1− ph − pl
(qh − ql)θ1 .
The demands for the low- and high-quality products in country 2 can be obtained in a similar
manner. Note however that the demands of consumers in country 2 depend on the price of the
product expressed in local currency, i.e., pl · e and ph · e, where e is the exchange rate expressed
in units of country 2’s currency per unit of country 1’s currency.
The demands in country 2 can be represented as,
d2l =
θ2h − θ2l
θ2
= e
qlph − plqh
(qh − ql)qlθ2 , and
d2h =
θ2 − θ2h
θ2
= 1− e ph − pl
(qh − ql)θ2 .
The firm’s profit is
pi = (pl − 12q
2
l )
qlph − plqh
(qh − ql)ql
(
1
θ1
+
e
θ2
)
+ (ph − 12q
2
h)
[
2− ph − pl
(qh − ql)
(
1
θ1
+
e
θ2
)]
with first-order conditions:
∂pi
∂pl
=
1
2
(θ2 + eθ1) [4(phql − plqh) + qlqh(ql − qh)]
(qh − ql)qlθ1θ2 = 0 ,and
∂pi
∂ph
=
1
2
(θ2 + eθ1)(4ph − 4pl + q2l − q2h)− 4θ1θ2(qh − ql)
(−qh + ql)qlθ1θ2 = 0.
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Solving these two equations simultaneously for pl, ph, we obtain the equilibrium prices,
p∗h =
1
4
[4θ1θ2 + qh(θ2 + eθ1)]qh
θ2 + eθ1
, p∗l =
1
4
ql[4θ1θ2 + ql(θ2 + eθ1)]
θ2 + eθ1
.
The equilibrium quantities are
d∗1l =
qh
4θ1
, d∗1h =
4eθ21 − (ql + qh)(θ2 + eθ1)
4θ1(θ2 + eθ1)
d∗2l =
qhe
4θ2
, d∗2h =
4θ22 − e(ql + qh)(θ2 + eθ1)
4θ2(θ2 + eθ1)
For d∗1h > 0 and d
∗
2h > 0, qh + ql < min
[
4eθ21
θ2+eθ1
,
4θ22
e(θ2+eθ1)
]
must hold. We assume that this is the
case throughout the article.
Scenario 2
The monopolist treats each market independently due to market segmentation and constant
marginal cost. The firm’s problem in country 1 is,
max
p1l,p1h
(p1l − 12q
2
l )d1l + (p1h −
1
2
q2h)d1h.
Similarly, the firm’s problem in country 2 is,
max
p2l,p2h
(p2l − 12q
2
l )d2l + (p2h −
1
2
q2h)d2h.
We solve the firm’s problem in the market 1 first. The marginal consumers are,
θ1l =
p1l
ql
, θ1h =
p1h − p1l
qh − ql
and thus the demands can be represented by,
d1l =
θ1h − θ1l
θ1
=
qlp1h − p1lqh
(qh − ql)qlθ1 , d1h =
θ1 − θ1h
θ1
= 1− p1h − p1l
(qh − ql)θ1 .
Firm’s profit is,
pi1 = (p1l − 12q
2
l )d1l + (p1h −
1
2
q2h)d1h
= (p1l − 12q
2
l )
qlp1h − p1lqh
(qh − ql)qlθ1 + (p1h −
1
2
q2h)(1−
p1h − p1l
(qh − ql)θ1 )
The first order conditions are,
∂pi1
∂p1l
=
4(p1hql − p1lqh) + qlqh(ql − qh)
2(qh − ql)qlθ1 ,
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∂pi1
∂p1h
=
4(p1h − p1l)− (qh − ql)(ql + qh + 2θ1)
2(−qh + ql)θ1 .
Solving these two equations simultaneously for p1l and p1h, we have,
p∗1h =
1
4
qh(2θ1 + qh), p∗1l =
1
4
ql(2θ1 + ql).
Thus the equilibrium quantities are,
d∗1l =
qh
4θ1
, d∗1h =
2θ1 − ql − qh
4θ1
.
Similarly, by solving the maximization problem of the monopolist in country 2, we can obtain
the following equilibrium prices and quantities,
p∗2h =
1
4
qh(2θ2 + eqh)/e, p∗2l =
1
4
ql(2θ2 + eql)/e
d∗2l =
eqh
4θ2
, d∗2h =
2θ2 − e(ql + qh)
4θ2
.
For d∗1h > 0 and d
∗
2h > 0, qh + ql < min [2θ1, 2θ2/e] must hold. Note that this condition is less
restrictive than qh + ql < min
[
4eθ21
θ2+eθ1
,
4θ22
e(θ2+eθ1)
]
established in scenario 1 for the quantities in
market 2 to be positive. Thus, d∗1h > 0 and d
∗
2h > 0 in scenario 2 holds.
2. Derivations of equations associated with corollary 3 and 4.
Corollary 3
First, we determine the sign of X − 1. Using equation (3), the sign of X − 1 corresponds to the
sign of (p∗l − p∗h)(σ1 − σ2). It can be easily shown that (p∗l − p∗h) < 0 because ql < qh. Moreover,
σ1 − σ2 = 4qh(θ2 + eθ1)
2(θ2 − eθ1)
[4eθ21 − ql(θ2 + eθ1)][4θ22 − eql(θ2 + eθ1)]
and the two elements of the denominator are positive given the assumption we made for all
quantities to be positive in equilibrium (see scenario 1 of this appendix). Thus, the sign of σ1−σ2
depends on the sign of θ2 − eθ1. When θ2 < eθ1, σ1 − σ2 < 0, and X − 1 > 0. When θ2 > eθ1,
σ1 − σ2 > 0, and X − 1 < 0.
Second, we determine the sign of ∂X∂qh . Because X =
P1
P2
, ∂X∂qh =
∂P1
∂qh
P2−P1 ∂P2∂qh
P 22
. Note that
P1 = σ1(p∗l − p∗h) + p∗h, P2 = σ2(p∗l − p∗h) + p∗h, and qh does not enter p∗l . Thus,
∂X
∂qh
=
[
∂σ1
∂qh
(p∗l − p∗h) +
∂p∗h
∂qh
(1− σ1)
]
P2 − P1
[
∂σ2
∂qh
(p∗l − p∗h) +
∂p∗h
∂qh
(1− σ2)
]
P 22
.
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Rearranging we obtain:
∂X
∂qh
=
(p∗l − p∗h)
(
∂σ1
∂qh
P2 − ∂σ2∂qhP1
)
− ∂p∗h∂qh (P2σ1 − P1σ2 − P2 + P1)
P 22
(A.1)
where σ1 =
qh(θ2+eθ1)
4eθ21−ql(θ2+eθ1)
, and σ2 =
qhe(θ2+eθ1)
4θ22−qle(θ2+eθ1)
.
Given the expressions for σ1 and σ2, ∂σ1∂qh =
σ1
qh
, ∂σ2∂qh =
σ2
qh
. Substituting for ∂σ1∂qh ,
∂σ2
∂qh
, P1, and
P2, equation (A.1) can be re-written as
∂X
∂qh
=
(σ1 − σ2)
[
(p∗l − p∗h)
p∗h
qh
− ∂p∗h∂qh p∗l
]
P 22
where (p∗l − p∗h)
p∗h
qh
− ∂p∗h∂qh p∗l < 0 because (p∗l − p∗h) < 0 and
∂p∗h
∂qh
= 4θ1θ2+2qh(θ2+eθ1)4(θ2+eθ1) > 0.
The above shows that the sign of ∂X∂qh also depends on the sign of σ1 − σ2, which we have
already determined depends on the sign of θ2 − eθ1.
Thus, when θ2 < eθ1, σ1 − σ2 < 0, X − 1 > 0, and ∂X∂qh > 0. When θ2 > eθ1, σ1 − σ2 > 0,
X − 1 < 0, and ∂X∂qh < 0.
Corollary 4
Because
Xl =
p∗1l
p∗2l
=
(2θ1 + ql)e
2θ2 + eql
,
Xh =
p∗1h
p∗2h
=
(2θ1 + qh)e
2θ2 + eqh
, and
X =
p∗1lσ1 + p
∗
1h(1− σ1)
p∗2lσ2 + p
∗
2h(1− σ2)
=
e(q2l + 4θ
2
1 − qhql − q2h)(2θ2 − eql)
(e2q2l + 4θ
2
2 − e2qhql − e2q2h)(2θ1 − ql)
,
then, when ql = qh = q, Xl = Xh = X =
(2θ1+q)e
2θ2+eq
.
In what follows, the equations allowing us to sign ∂X∂qh are derived. Rewrite X as X =
p∗1l
p∗2l
σ1
σ2
A
B
where A = 1 + p
∗
1h
p∗1l
(
1−σ1
σ1
)
and B = 1 + p
∗
2h
p∗2l
(
1−σ2
σ2
)
. Therefore,
∂X
∂qh
=
p∗1l
p∗2l
σ1
σ2
1
B2
B
∂
(
p∗1h
p∗1l
)
∂qh
(
1− σ1
σ1
)
+
p∗1h
p∗1l
∂
(
1−σ1
σ1
)
∂qh
−A
∂
(
p∗2h
p∗2l
)
∂qh
(
1− σ2
σ2
)
+
p∗2h
p∗2l
∂
(
1−σ2
σ2
)
∂qh

(A.2)
where p
∗
1h
p∗1l
= qh(2θ1+qh)ql(2θ1+ql) ,
1−σ1
σ1
= 2θ1−ql−qhqh ,
p∗2h
p∗2l
= qh(2θ2+eqh)ql(2θ2+eql) , and
1−σ2
σ2
= 2θ2−e(ql+qh)eqh . The
derivative of these expressions with respect to qh can be written as:
∂
(
p∗1h
p∗
1l
)
∂qh
= p
∗
1h
p∗1lqh
+ qh4p∗1l ,
∂
(
1−σ1
σ1
)
∂qh
= −1σ1qh ,
∂
(
p∗2h
p∗
2l
)
∂qh
= p
∗
2h
p∗2lqh
+ qh4p∗2l , and
∂
(
1−σ2
σ2
)
∂qh
= −1σ2qh .
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Substituting these last four expressions into (A.2), we obtain
∂X
∂qh
=
p∗1l
p∗2l
σ1
σ2
1
B2
{
B
[
− p
∗
1h
p∗1lqh
+
qh
4p∗1l
(
1− σ1
σ1
)]
−A
[
− p
∗
2h
p∗2lqh
+
qh
4p∗2l
(
1− σ2
σ2
)]}
,
which can be rewritten as
∂X
∂qh
=
p∗1l
p∗2l
σ1
σ2
1
B2
{
1
qh
(
p∗2h
p∗2l
A− p
∗
1h
p∗1l
B
)
+
qh
4
[
B
p∗1l
(
1− σ1
σ1
)
− A
p∗2l
(
1− σ2
σ2
)]}
.
After substituting for A and B within the curly brackets and rearranging we obtain:
∂X
∂qh
= p
∗
1l
p∗2l
σ1
σ2
1
B2
{
1
qh
[(
p∗2h
p∗2l
− p∗1hp∗1l
)
+ p
∗
1hp
∗
2h
p∗1lp
∗
2l
(
1−σ1
σ1
− 1−σ2σ2
)]
+ qh4
[(
1−σ1
σ1p∗1l
− 1−σ2σ2p∗2l
)
+ p
∗
2h−p∗1h
p∗1lp
∗
2l
(
1−σ1
σ1
)(
1−σ2
σ2
)]}
.
Then, we substitute for the equilibrium prices and market shares and simplify to obtain:
∂X
∂qh
=
1
p∗2l
σ1
σ2
1
B2
(eθ1 − θ2)(eθ1 + θ2)(2qh + ql)
eql(2θ2 + eql)
.
The sign of ∂X∂qh is the sign of eθ1 − θ2.
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